Oxford Biosecurity Group is launching our 2025 Call for Project Proposals, as well as a general project lead expression of interest.  Have a project idea you want to lead, or are interested in developing one?  Apply and submit a proposal to run an impactful biosecurity project that 3+ researchers can work on remotely. Want to express interest in leading future projects?  Complete the first stage of the application process to apply to be added to our talent database, join the Oxford Biosecurity Group Slack and access networking opportunities.  Key details:  Minimum experience: 2+ years post-undergraduate in relevant area OR completed biosecurity fellowship/project Application process: initial interest form, project proposal, 30-minute video interview Project dates: 20th October - 13th December 2025 Location: Remote, and we accept applications from anywhere in the world Time commitment: project scoping, 5-10 hours per week during the project period, 10-20 hours for researcher application review between mid-September and mid-October Compensation: £1500 total stipend, up to £100 default project expenses Timeline at a glance:  Note: Application/decision dates are approximate and may vary by a few days within the indicated weeks. Learn more and apply:  Find out more information in our application pack . It gives more details about the process, timelines, and what we are looking for in applicants and potential projects.  If you have any questions, please reach out at projectleads@oxfordbiosecuritygroup.com .   Apply here  by 7th July 2025!

Biosecurity, broadly, refers to ways to prevent the introduction and spread of diseases, and it is one of the most important and pressing global challenges. What are some reasons that you should work on biosecurity? [1] The potential harm is catastrophic. Pandemics have caused a large death toll throughout history . The Black Death is estimated to have wiped out at least a third of the European population . Smallpox killed approximately 300 million people in the 20th century alone before its eradication in 1980 . The COVID-19 pandemic caused over 7 million confirmed deaths globally, but the excess deaths compared to a typical year may be 2-5x this . Since then, there have been outbreaks of mpox  and H5N1 , with concerns about the pandemic risk of these pathogens. It has been estimated that there is an approximately   2% risk of a COVID-like pandemic occurring in a given year , and future pandemics may be even worse .  [2] The risks are increasing. The frequency of outbreaks from zoonotic spillover events  (spread from animals to people) has increased in recent decades, and this is predicted to increase further due to factors such as climate change. Emerging technologies such as advances in synthetic biology and AI also increase biosecurity risk, as such research can be dual-use  and may be misused by bad actors. While the development or use of biological weapons by states and terrorists is not new , advances in technologies mean that a greater number of people may have the capability to do harm. For example, recent AI models are outperforming PhD virologists  in solving nuanced biological problems, and this technology is advancing rapidly. This harm may also be accidental, through accidental release or research leading to unexpected risks. For example, recently there has been a call to stop research on mirror life , including mirror bacteria, due to an ‘unprecedented risk’ to life on Earth if these bacteria were to be created.  [3] The risks can be reduced. There are many things that can be done  to prevent, detect, and respond to pandemics and reduce biosecurity risks. For example, advances in  and use of  air disinfection and filtration technologies may prevent or reduce the indoor spread of pandemics, and seasonal influenza in a typical year. Advances in  and strategic positioning of  disease surveillance may be able to detect a potential pandemic when there are only a few cases globally. The first COVID-19 vaccine candidate was designed within 2 days  of the genetic sequence being published, and the 100 Days Mission aims to create a vaccine for a new virus within 100 days  - a technical, logistical and regulatory challenge. Work by and coordination between various stakeholders can reduce risks from emerging technologies while maintaining benefits. Examples include screening DNA synthesis customers and orders  for dangerous sequences, and managed access frameworks  for certain tools and data. However, despite promising approaches, significant challenges remain in development and implementation. [4] More people are needed. Pandemics have often gone from panic to neglect , biosecurity remains neglected given the scale of the issue, and often planning  and funding availability  do not focus on the most extreme risks. More work needs to be done, and more people from a range of backgrounds are needed. This includes people with experience in policy, communications and operations, and entrepreneurs to start or scale impactful projects.  You can have a large, global impact working on biosecurity. If this resonates with you, consider how your skills and interests might contribute to biosecurity work. You may find this list of resources  useful, and if you are interested in hands-on experience, we run research projects that help people gain skills and connections in the field.

Summary Oxford Biosecurity Group (OBG) conducts global research projects in collaboration with technical and policy organisations, to foster talent and tackle issues in biosecurity and the intersection of AI and biology. This document summarises the capacity building impact of our two project cycles that were run in 2024: OBG24-1 (7 weeks, January-March 2024) and OBG24-2 (8 weeks, May-June 2024), by looking at career plan updates, skills and connections gained, and next steps of past participants.  In total in 2024, 48 researchers have completed one project cycle, and 3 have completed two project cycles. Outside of the co-founding team, 8 project leads ran projects in one project cycle, and 1 project lead ran projects in two project cycles, and we’ve had researchers or project leads from every populated continent. We identified 31 promising participants for further support and opportunities.  Based on form responses, in OBG24-1, 33% rated OBG to have increased their likelihood of going into a biosecurity career, and another 20% said they decided to do additional research as a result. In OBG24-2, the mean increase in how much people were considering biosecurity as a career path increased by 1.5/10, and the median was 2/10, with the mean and median after projects being 8.4/10 and 9/10 respectively. For both OBG24-1 and OBG24-2, the most frequent skills gained by researchers were ‘deeper understanding of biosecurity’ and ‘research skills’, and the median number of new connections in biosecurity researchers were happy to ask for a favour was 3 (the mean being 3 and 4.4 for OBG24-1 and OBG24-2 respectively).  All participants indicated they would do at least one concrete action relating to getting more involved in biosecurity, including stating they would apply for internships and full-time jobs. The next steps of past participants include Bluedot Impact, Existential Risk Laboratory, founding and directing a non-profit, and continuing with full-time or part-time work with the collaborating organisation.  Introduction Oxford Biosecurity Group (OBG) conducts global research projects in collaboration with technical and policy organisations, to foster talent and tackle issues in biosecurity and the intersection of AI and biology. Past projects have been run in areas such as AI-bio, synthetic DNA regulation policy, and lab safety governance, with collaborators such as Alliance to Feed the Earth in Disasters (ALLFED), CEPI, and Center for AI Safety. Since our founding in October 2023, we have run 3 project cycles including our pilot cycle. Projects are typically run in 2-3 month ‘project cycles’ of 5 or more projects, which allows for economies of scale for operational and time costs for processes such as recruitment and onboarding, and for easier resource sharing and networking across projects. Each project is led by a project lead, with 3-6 researchers each spending 5-10 hours a week doing research. Researchers and project leads can gain skills, experience and networks in biosecurity, and promising researchers are referred by us for additional support and opportunities.  OBG influences biosecurity in two significant ways: capacity building and direct project outcomes. Firstly, by enhancing biosecurity capacity, OBG attracts talented individuals to the field, helps them develop their skills, expands their professional networks, and connects them with opportunities. Secondly, OBG makes an impact through the tangible results achieved through the outcomes of the projects themselves.  This document presents the findings of our impact evaluation in increasing biosecurity capacity of the two project cycles that were run in 2024: OBG24-1 (7 weeks, January-March 2024) and OBG24-2 (8 weeks, May-June 2024). In addition to this, we have a document with participants’ next steps and testimonials, which is not publicly shareable for privacy reasons. For the summary of our project outcomes, see here .  Methods Capacity building impact looks at both career accelerations and career changes. The former primarily refers to people who have decided to work in biosecurity, where OBG is most helpful in helping them gain experience, skills and connections, which then helps them in getting future jobs or grants in the space. The latter includes and primarily looks at people who had not previously decided on a career in biosecurity, for example, those who may not previously have considered it but who have a relevant background or skills, or those who are deciding between a biosecurity career and various other options. However, it could also include somebody who had decided to work in biosecurity changing which area in biosecurity they plan to focus their career on, where the participant mentions this to us.  This impact evaluation looks at short-term outcomes, as the pilot project cycle only finished in December 2023 and therefore not enough time has passed for longer-term outcomes to be evaluated. To determine longer-term outcomes, participants will be followed up with again 1-2 years after the end of their respective projects, however, this is not yet possible as not enough time has passed. The rest of this section gives more details about which metrics are used and how this information is collected.  Metrics to Evaluate Career Changes The main metric that is primarily relevant for career changes is ‘Career Plan Updates’: has there been any change to the amount that the participant is considering biosecurity as a career? Career Accelerations The main metrics that are primarily relevant for career accelerations are:  Skills Gained Which skills the participant improved through taking part in the project Network Building How many people the participant knows through OBG that they are now happy to ask for a favour, e.g. to reach out to for advice Both The following metrics are looked at equally for both career changes and career accelerations:  Referrals and support How many participants are identified for referral or provided with further support This is based both on the interests and career plans of the participant and on the participant’s performance in projects Next steps What concrete actions the participants go on to do after the end of the projects (e.g. career changes, but also relevant courses and further study) As this takes time for participants to do this, we also ask about planned next steps It is difficult to determine exactly how much OBG influenced these next steps  In some cases we expect the actions would most likely not have occurred without OBG (e.g. a participants continuing with the collaborating organisation), while in other cases OBG would have played a contributing role (e.g. relevant experience from OBG increasing the chance of a participant being accepted into a fellowship they applied for). In some cases, participants may have taken these next steps regardless of whether or not they did OBG. Collecting Data Data to evaluate short-term outcomes is primarily collected from:  Responses to researcher and project lead feedback forms Testimonials from participants (primarily internal/for very limited sharing) Number of participants OBG directly refers to relevant people/opportunities or otherwise given follow-on support Followup of past participants and looking at their publicly available online presence The Forms At the end of the projects, researcher feedback forms and project lead feedback forms are sent out to the researchers and project leads respectively. For OBG24-2 we added an onboarding form which researchers were encouraged to fill in during the kickoff presentations. This was both to help improve the researcher experience and for us to compare the stated likelihood of going into a biosecurity career both before and after the project period. The following information is obtained from the project lead and researchers forms, through numerical answers (e.g. rankings out of 10), multiple choice questions and free text responses.  Researchers:  Likelihood of going into biosecurity as a career path Researcher skills gained and career plans (qualitative and quantitative) Specific stated next steps relating to biosecurity researchers are planning Project leads: Project lead skills gained and career plans (qualitative and quantitative) Any promising researchers who we can refer to for other opportunities There are additional questions including those that relate to participant experiences, which have also been analysed and will make up part of our retrospective.  Number of Form Responses Project Leads At least one project lead for each of the projects completed the project leads feedback form. When doing numerical analysis in the sections below, the ratings and responses from the OBG co-founders were not included to avoid bias. This gives a remaining sample size of 4 project leads for both OBG24-1 and OBG24-2 . Note that due to the small sample size here, individual responses will influence the overall outcome a lot, and any numerical rankings should not be used to draw strong conclusions without other evidence. Researchers OBG24-1 15 researchers filled in the feedback form . This is a 51.7% feedback form completion rate  given the 29 researchers who completed projects in this project cycle. Of these, 5 responses were anonymous.  OBG24-2 For OBG24-2, we added an onboarding form to help improve the researcher experience (the question ‘What would you most like to get out of this project with OBG?’ was asked) and to enable us to ask about the researcher’s interest in biosecurity as a career path both before and after their OBG project.  29 researchers filled in the onboarding form . This is a 70.7% onboarding form completion rate  given the 41 researchers who started projects in this project cycle. In addition to this, 2 project leads filled in the form. This was useful for improving their experience, but this data is not included in the analysis later in this document.  21 researchers filled in the feedback form . This is an 84% feedback form completion rate  given the 25 researchers who completed projects in this project cycle. Of the 21 researchers, 7 filled in the form anonymously, and one person filled in the feedback form but not the onboarding form. This leaves 13 (non-anonymous) researchers who filled in both the onboarding and feedback forms , allowing us to compare their responses.  Results This section summarises responses to the questions in the feedback form that are relevant to biosecurity capacity building.  Career Plan Updates Both the numerical and text-based responses were analysed to determine the likely career impacts of both cycles.  OBG24-1 For OBG24-1, there was no onboarding form, so the researchers were asked the following multiple-choice questions in the researcher feedback form: Were you previously considering a career in biosecurity (select one)? Has OBG made you more likely to pursue a career in biosecurity (select one or multiple)? These questions followed directly from the ‘How familiar were you with biosecurity before applying (select one or multiple)?’ question.  The results were processed so that: “Biosecurity was and still is my top career choice” if they selected:  “Yes, it was my top choice career path” for “Were you previously considering a career in biosecurity (select one)?” AND “No update/my likelihood of going into biosecurity as a career has not changed” OR "Yes, biosecurity is now my top career choice" for “Has OBG made you more likely to pursue a career in biosecurity (select one or multiple)?” “Biosecurity was and still is one of the career options I am strongly considering” if they selected: “Yes, it was one of several options I was strongly considering” for “Were you previously considering a career in biosecurity (select one)?” AND “No update/my likelihood of going into biosecurity as a career has not changed” OR "Yes, biosecurity is now one of my top potential career options" for “Has OBG made you more likely to pursue a career in biosecurity (select one or multiple)?” One researcher selected the ‘additional research’ and ‘unsure’ options, but other than that after processing there was one response per researcher.  We also asked an additional optional question:  What are your current career plans and how did OBG influence these? (Optional) Description: Please give some details about what your current career plans are. This is optional but would be useful for us to get context on your above answers and to evaluate our impact. 7 researchers responded to this question, of which 4 referred directly to OBG’s influence. One of those specifically mentioned their project with OBG made them more open to having a career in biosecurity, and the other three mentioned increased clarity of what work in different areas of biosecurity might look like.  OBG24-2 Researchers were asked about their likelihood of going into a biosecurity career in both the onboarding and feedback forms. This was done using the following questions, and researchers selected a rating out of 10 in both cases:  How much were you considering biosecurity as a career path before hearing about OBG? Description: 1 = I was not considering biosecurity as a career path before hearing about OBG. 10 = Biosecurity is my top choice career path. How interested are you in biosecurity as a career path? Description: 1 = I am not interested in biosecurity as a career path. 10 = Biosecurity is my top choice career path. In total, 13 researchers filled in both the onboarding and feedback forms non-anonymously, allowing us to compare their responses. The average ratings both before (from the onboarding form) and after (from the feedback form) are given below.  Of the 13 people who filled out both forms, four increased their stated likelihood of going into a biosecurity career by 3/10, and one by 4/10. Two of the researchers who increased their stated likelihood of going into biosecurity by 3/10 are also on the list of researchers identified for referral to further opportunities based on their performance in the projects. If you include all the responses for the onboarding and feedback forms: Of the 29 people who filled in the onboarding form, the mean interest in biosecurity as a career before the projects was 6.07/10 and the median was 6/10.  Of the 21 people who filled in the feedback form, the mean interest in biosecurity as a career after the projects was 8.38/10 and the median was 9/10. Note however that some of this difference may be due to people who are less interested in biosecurity to begin with being more likely to drop out of the projects. However, the mean and median for everyone who filled in the feedback form, and those who filled in both, were very similar (mean = 8.4, median = 9), suggesting that those researchers may be representative of the people finishing the projects. We also asked an additional optional question:  What are your current career plans and how did OBG influence these? (Optional) Description: Please give some details about what your current career plans are. This is optional but would be useful for us to get context on your above answers and to evaluate our impact. 8 researchers responded to this question, of which 5 mentioned some influence from OBG: One researcher we identified for referral said that as a result of their project, they are considering a role in biosecurity and another area of existential risk, and selected 'Apply for a full-time job related to biosecurity' as a concrete next step.  One researcher mentioned that OBG opened their eyes to "this important field”, and that they would be interested in going into it further.  Two researchers explicitly mention that OBG is likely to be useful for their CV, including one that mentioned OBG “probably helped” them when applying for the research fellowship they then completed. One researcher identified for referral whose stated likelihood of going into biosecurity increased by 3/10 mentioned that learning about how to approach and research a biosecurity question was helpful. Skills Gained Both researchers and project leads were asked the question ‘How useful did you find OBG for gaining skills related to biosecurity?’, to which they had to give an integer rating out of 10.  Researchers were also asked to select the sorts of skills they had gained. They could select one or multiple of the following options: What skills do you think you have improved in your OBG project? Research skills Deeper understanding of biosecurity Project management skills Time management skills Communication skills Specific technical skills, e.g. programming, modelling None of the above The multiple choice options for this question are likely to be updated over time, due to ongoing conversations with biosecurity experts about skills gaps within biosecurity. OBG24-1 The average rating out of 10 for the question ‘How useful did you find OBG for gaining skills related to biosecurity?’ for OBG24-1 for both project leads and researchers is given below.  There was only one researcher who gave a rating of 1/10 for this question. They noted that they did so because they had quite a lot of past biosecurity experience, but that they still found their OBG project to be a great experience. The following graph gives some detail about the specific skills that people have gained, with a deeper understanding of biosecurity and research skills being the two most commonly selected options. The person who ranked the project 1/10 for gaining research skills was also one of the two respondents who selected ‘None of the above’ for this question. OBG24-2 The average rating out of 10 for the question ‘How useful did you find OBG for gaining skills related to biosecurity?’ for OBG24-2  for both project leads and researchers is given below.  One specific project was particularly low scoring. We investigated the cause of this low rating, identified the problem and provided coaching to the project lead of this project so that they will not have similar issues in the future. We also reached out personally to the individual researchers to troubleshoot their experience. If the responses from that project are removed from the calculation, the remaining sample size for researchers would be 17 rather than 21, giving a mean score of 8.2/10 and a median score of 9/10. The following graph gives some detail about the specific skills that people have gained, with a deeper understanding of biosecurity and research skills being the two most commonly selected options.  Both of the researchers who selected ‘None of the above’ for the specific skills gained were in the project which was particularly low ranking.  The percentage of people selecting ‘deeper understanding of biosecurity’ remained relatively similar to the previous cycle, but the percentage of respondents who selected ‘research skills’ increased significantly. It is uncertain why this is, but may be due to two of the projects having an academic publication as a target output from the start of the project. Network Building Part of the value researchers and project leads get out of OBG is through building networks. A lot of this benefit comes from specific targeted connections and referrals, however, both researchers and project leads were asked: How many new people working on or interested in biosecurity do you now know, who you would be happy to ask a favour? Description: This might be something like asking for feedback on something that you are writing. An estimate is fine if you are uncertain. OBG24-1 In OBG24-1: For researchers, the mean and median number  of new people they would now be happy to ask a favour was 3 For project leads, the mean number  of new people they would now be happy to ask a favour was   7.75, and the median was 4.5 Note that the project leads have a sample size of 4, so the mean number was largely influenced by one project lead who wrote that there were 20 people who were now happy to ask for a favour. OBG24-2 In OBG24-2: For researchers, the mean number  of new people they would now be happy to ask a favour was   4.4, and the median was 3 For project leads, the mean number  of new people they would now be happy to ask a favour was   3.5, and the median was 3.5 Referrals and Support These referrals included recommending promising researchers or project leads to people within biosecurity who can offer additional support and opportunities, and direct referral to biosecurity mentoring opportunities, or otherwise provided with further support. Specifics are not included for privacy reasons, but numbers are given below. In addition to this we identified 5 people from our pilot project cycle ending in December 2023, with followup done in 2024.   OBG24-1 We  identified 13 people for referral  as a result of the OBG24-1 project cycle, made up of 11 researchers and 2 project leads.   OBG24-2 We  identified 13 people for referral  as a result of the OBG24-2 project cycle, made up of 11 researchers and 2 project leads.  Of these 13 people, two were previously involved in OBG24-1 but were referred after this as a result of further involvement in OBG24-2. Participant Next Steps Stated Next Steps Researchers were asked about their planned next steps in the researcher feedback form. The following options were given: What concrete actions do you now plan to take? Do further research or reading into biosecurity Reach out to and speak to experts in biosecurity to learn from them Research and write up something relating to biosecurity Continue with the OBG project that you have been working on or a very similar project Do another biosecurity-related project Apply for a Master's or PhD relating to biosecurity Look into potential supervisors for biosecurity-related graduate study Apply for an internship relating to biosecurity Apply for a full-time job relating to biosecurity Other None of the above This was done in part for impact evaluation, and in part to encourage researchers to concretely think about their next steps in biosecurity. Note that we cannot say how much these plans were influenced by participation in the OBG projects, as respondents might still have been planning these actions without OBG. OBG24-1 The responses for the OBG24-1 project cycle are given below:  The most frequently selected options were ‘do further research or reading into biosecurity’, ‘do another biosecurity-related project’ and ‘continue with the OBG project you have been working on, or a very similar project’.  Four respondents selected ‘apply for an internship relating to biosecurity’, one selected ‘apply for a Master’s or PhD relating to biosecurity’, and one selected ‘apply for a full-time job relating to biosecurity’ (note: this person had also selected ‘apply for an internship’). Two of the people who indicated they would apply for an internship relating to biosecurity were identified for referral and referred to people within biosecurity who could offer additional support and resources. The researcher who indicated both ‘apply for a full-time job’ and ‘apply for an internship’ is on our list of researchers to potentially work on future projects. The remaining researchers who selected ‘apply for an internship’ filled in the feedback form anonymously, so we cannot follow up with them.  Every respondent planned to do at least one concrete action. OBG24-2 The responses for the OBG24-1 project cycle are given below: The most frequently selected options were ‘do further research or reading into biosecurity’, ‘research and write up something relating to biosecurity’ and ‘do another biosecurity-related project’.  Six respondents selected ‘apply for an internship relating to biosecurity’, two selected ‘apply for a Master’s or PhD relating to biosecurity’, and four selected ‘apply for a full-time job relating to biosecurity’. There was some overlap between these responses - one person selected all three, one selected both the full-time job and the internship options, and one selected both the internship and Master’s/PhD options. The person who selected all three potential options was one of the researchers identified for referral, as is one of the other people who selected the ‘full-time job’ option, and two others who selected the ‘internship’ option. Two people who selected the ‘full-time job’ option filled in the form anonymously, which means we cannot follow up with them even though they indicated in the form that they were open to being contacted about the concrete actions they planned on taking.     Every respondent planned to do at least one concrete action. Next Steps in Followup This section highlights some notable next steps of past participants, based on initial follow-up conducted in September/October 2024 (apart from where noted). Additional follow-up is planned for early-mid 2025.  All information presented is either publicly available (where participants have mentioned both their OBG participation and their subsequent roles on LinkedIn or another public platform) or anonymised to protect privacy. While testimonials suggest OBG had a significant impact on some participants' next steps, it is difficult to determine how much of a counterfactual impact OBG had in all cases. For example, some participants may have only been partially influenced or aided by OBG (e.g. giving them relevant experience to help them get a role they would have applied for anyway), or have pursued similar paths regardless. We note that there are additional success stories that are not included here. OBG24-1 OBG24-1 finished ~6 months  before the initial follow-up was done. Some notable next steps of participants (researchers and project leads) of OBG24-1 are summarised below:  Founding and directing a related non-profit: 1 Attended the Biological Weapons Convention as a Next Generation Biosecurity delegate: 1 Biosecurity (or AI-biosecurity) contracting at a relevant think tank (Centre for Long-Term Resilience): 2 NB: both November 2024 start, information obtained from LinkedIn Continued working/contracting with the collaborating organisation: 1 Took part in a biosecurity (or AI-biosecurity) related fellowship (Existential Risk Laboratory/Pivotal Research/ERA Cambridge): 2 Teaching fellow for a biosecurity-related course (Bluedot Impact): 1 OBG24-2 OBG24-2 finished ~3 months  before the initial follow-up, leaving little time for participants to take concrete next steps. However, there are some notable next steps that we are aware of: Continued working/contracting with the collaborating organisation: 2 Took part in a biosecurity (or AI-biosecurity) related fellowship (Existential Risk Laboratory/Pivotal Research/ERA Cambridge): 1 This should not be compared directly to the results of the previous project cycle given that little time had passed. However, this shows that some participants had already been able to do further work in the space, and we are aware of other participants who have applied for relevant roles.  Conclusion OBG influences biosecurity in two significant ways: capacity building and direct project outcomes. This document summarises our impact in increasing biosecurity capacity of the two project cycles that were run in 2024. The majority of participants are more interested in a career in biosecurity after doing their project and have gained at least one skill and several valuable connections to help them do so. All participants stated that they would take at least one concrete action relating to getting more involved in biosecurity, and some have already gone on to take roles in the field.  Building on this success, OBG plans to run multiple projects and at least one project cycle in 2025. Our ability to run these projects and train more biosecurity professionals depends on two key forms of support: financial contributions and strategic partnerships. Visit our website  for up-to-date information about our current projects and opportunities to get involved.  To support our work through funding, please donate here  or contact us at fundraising@oxfordbiosecuritygroup.com . For potential collaborations and partnerships, please reach out to partnerships@oxfordbiosecuritygroup.com .

Thanks for your interest in getting involved in Oxford Biosecurity Group! Please read below to find out more about how to get involved. Join Us Thanks for your interest in joining Oxford Biosecurity Group! Please read more about the different ways you can get involved below. Join as a Researcher Researchers typically spend 5-10 hours a week working on their project during the project period. This is a voluntary role, and researchers gain experience, skills and connections while contributing to impactful projects. We plan to next launch researcher applications in January/February 2026. Please sign up here to be notified when applications open. Join as a Project Lead We are currently doing a general interest call for project leads to join our talent database and potentially lead future projects. This form will next be reviewed in December 2025 - apply here by 9th December! Join as a Collaborator Many of our past projects have been in collaboration with other organisations. If you are interested in collaborating with us, please reach out at partnerships@oxfordbiosecuritygroup.com . Join the Team We are not currently actively recruiting for any other roles. However, please reach out to contact@oxfordbiosecuritygroup.com if you are interested in helping organise any of our initiatives, or in biosecurity capacity building more broadly. Fund Us Oxford Biosecurity Group is fundraising, and we'd love your support. If you're a interested in supporting our mission, please see our donation page here or reach out to us at fundraising@oxfordbiosecuritygroup.com . Anything Else We are excited to connect with anyone interested in supporting our mission. If you'd like to get involved in Oxford Biosecurity Group in any other capacity, please email us at contact@oxfordbiosecuritygroup.com .

Biosecurity Considerations of Controlled Human Infection Model Studies (OBG24-2) Project Outline This project seeks to evaluate the biosecurity risks associated with conducting controlled human infection model (CHIM) studies. Researchers on this project will conduct assessments of several key risks of conducting CHIM studies, identify and evaluate additional risks, explore how these risks apply to specific pathogens, and detail mitigation strategies for these risks. We expect much of this project will consist of expert interviews, literature reviews, and desk research to identify potential risks, assess the threat level of those risks, and determine the best mechanisms for mitigating them while retaining the many benefits of CHIM research. Background & Motivation This project seeks to evaluate the biosecurity risks associated with conducting controlled human infection model (CHIM) studies. Researchers on this project will conduct assessments of several key risks of conducting CHIM studies, identify and evaluate additional risks, explore how these risks apply to specific pathogens, and detail mitigation strategies for these risks. We expect much of this project will consist of expert interviews, literature reviews, and desk research to identify potential risks, assess the threat level of those risks, and determine the best mechanisms for mitigating them while retaining the many benefits of CHIM research. Project Outcome Research Questions Summary of work shared with collaborators and fed into a paper which has been submitted for academic publication. Preprint: https://www.authorea.com/users/894713/articles/1271248-biosecurity-considerations-of-controlled-human-infection-model-studies During the project, the researchers will work on the following: 1. A risk assessment of the biosecurity risks of CHIM studies and the infrastructure necessary to conduct them. This will be done through methods such as reviewing the literature and speaking to experts, and will look both at risks that have already been identified and potential additional risks. 2. An evaluation of how these risks apply to specific pathogens and types of pathogens (e.g. advances in pathogen engineering may be higher risk for viruses than bacteria and for certain families of viruses over others). This should include a discussion of pathogen characteristics that increase risk. Researchers should focus first on respiratory pathogens with pandemic potential, such as influenza, SARS-CoV-2, and MERS-CoV, but, where relevant, should include considerations for other diseases such as those on CEPI’s priority pathogen list.), WHO’s priority pathogens list, and Disease X. 3. An evaluation of the relationship between the benefits and risks of CHIMs (briefly discussed in this Pandemic ethics accelerator report, but not deeply assessed yet). 4. A recommendation of methods of mitigating these risks while retaining, as much as possible, the benefits of CHIM studies. 5. A discussion of how this risk/benefit analysis might differ for CHIM studies conducted in LMICs. The main deliverable will be a resulting white paper. Project researchers are not expected to complete the white paper in the 8-week project period, and are welcome, but not expected to continue throughout the writing process alongside other co-authors. All work will be acknowledged through authorship. A list of experts to consult will be included in project briefing materials. Experts will be introduced and lined up in advance of the project start to minimise delay. Project Collaborators 1Day Sooner; Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI). Eliciting the Biological Knowledge of AI Models (OBG24-2) Project Outline AI models might contain biological knowledge that could be misused, and recently a method was introduced that made these AI models "unlearn” this knowledge. This project will explore how various tools, like advanced prompting techniques, or an access to the Internet, might help these models regain this knowledge. Researchers will use methods such as understanding-based and behavioral evaluations of AI models, as well as scaffolding and prompt engineering of AI models. The key result of the research will be the final report, which will be shared with key stakeholders. Background & Motivation COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated that humanity is unable to contain new pathogens, and ill-prepared for new pandemics in the future. General purpose AI models, as well as AI tools capable of predicting pathogenic properties of viruses, are becoming more capable, so in the upcoming years they might be used for designing new pathogens. Actors might use these tools to deliberately start a new pandemic, or it might be a result of an accidental lab leak. A recent paper introduced a Weapons of Mass Destruction Proxy (WMDP) benchmark that measures knowledge of an AI model that is necessary for biological, cyber, and nuclear attacks. The biological part of WMDP benchmark focuses on knowledge necessary for developing and disseminating agents able to cause a pandemic. The paper also introduced a method for "unlearning" this knowledge that makes a model to "forget" this dangerous information. The authors demonstrated the effectiveness of this method by measuring an AI model performance without any additional capabilities, like an ability to browse the internet, access to scientific literature, or advanced prompting techniques. These tools tend to improve performance of AI models, and they might improve the performance of a model after it has unlearned hazardous knowledge. The preliminary experiment showed that they might improve model performance on the benchmark. This project can become a good first step in a career in AI biosecurity. Governments around the world, including the US, the UK, and the EU, are developing methods for evaluating biosecurity risks posed by AI models. This project might help to develop relevant expertise, portfolio, and to grow the right network. Project Outcome Research Questions The concept of a benchmark was created, published as a preprint “BioLP-bench Measuring understanding of AI models of biological lab protocols”, which was used by OpenAI in their O1 system card biosecurity threat evaluation (see section 4.5.7 of the system card). Preprint: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2024.08.21.608694v4 The main questions of the project: - Which scaffolding methods and affordances are effective for an AI model to acquire knowledge about biosecurity threats for a model with no such knowledge? - Whether such methods might be used to create a useful behavioral benchmark for AI models? As there are many tools that might improve performance of an AI model, there is a room for participants to choose which methods do they want to use in their research. The result of the research will be summarised into a report, which will be shared with experts and key stakeholders. Experts will be consulted before making any output public, and anything that might be an infohazard will be removed before publication. Project Collaborators Center for AI Safety (CAIS). Analysis of Gaps and Opportunities for Improved Governance in High-Containment Laboratories in African Regions (OBG24-1) Project Outline This research project aims to understand the existing governance structure and gaps in managing high-containment level laboratories in the African region and identify actionable opportunities for improving governance. As a researcher on the project, you will research in one or more countries, depending on your experience and capacity, to understand the governance structure, which will include collecting and analyzing current regulations and policies governing the operations of high-containment labs in the study country/countries and identifying existing gaps and actionable opportunities for improving the governance. The research will prioritize countries with [IHR-JEE scores](https://extranet.who.int/sph/jee) of 1 - 3 level on Biosafety and Biosecurity. Aside from global impact, the research findings are expected to have a significant impact on regional efforts such as the Signature Initiative, African Union Panel on Emerging Technology (APET), African Biosafety Network of Expertise (ABNE), and national institutions such as NBA Kenya, KMLTTB, NBMA Nigeria, MLSCN, NBA Ghana, Biosafety SA, among others. As a researcher on the project, you will have the opportunity to conduct policy analysis, engage with practitioners where possible, and gain hands-on experience in Biorisk policy in Africa. This positions you to contribute positively to shaping governance and reducing the likelihood of catastrophic biological events. Background & Motivation As biotechnology and dual-use research continue to advance, there is a growing likelihood of intentional or unintentional catastrophic biological events stemming from the activities of high-containment biological laboratories. While experts recognize the importance of these labs for public health, they also stress the need for strict oversight and regulation to prevent the spread of pathogens into the environment. In Africa, biosecurity concerns are not always prioritized due to limited time and resources, and many scientists lack training in laboratory biosecurity and relevant international regulations. Despite the presence of few BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs in the region, the increasing economy, technology, and urbanization in most African nations make it likely that there will be an increase in the number of such labs in the future, emphasizing the importance of enacting appropriate regulations and oversight. Implementing effective policies and regulations on high-containment level facilities will mitigate and reduce risks from labs, providing long-term protection impact. The ultimate goal is to ensure that global catastrophic biological events arising from the activities of high-containment biological labs from the region are averted. Project Outcome Research Questions A final report was produced, an abstract was accepted for oral presentation at the International Pandemic Sciences Conference 2024, and the project's findings will be disseminated to national and regional stakeholders, potentially feeding into lab safety practices. Over the seven weeks, a researcher will contribute to answering some of these questions. Questions one, two, and three deal with specific countries, while questions four and five regionally. 1. What are the existing governance practices for managing the operation of high-containment level labs? Focusing on a specific country and understanding the context, such as which government institutions and their governance responsibility and mandates. If multiple institutions are involved, what governance responsibility exists within each? 2. What gaps exist in the current governance structure of high-containment levels labs? This will involve identifying lacking regulations, policies, or administrative measures; also, the question will seek to understand gaps within the regulatory institution. Are the institutions making the governance lacking? Are their issues with centralization or decentralization? Are the institution's capacity or resources constraints to make more effective governance? 3. What actionable opportunities are available to strengthen and make governance more robust and effective? Researchers will justify with evidence what makes the recommendation actionable and explain how the recommendation connects to one or several gaps identified. 4. What regional organizations/institutions could shape and improve the governance, and in what ways? What's currently lacking? 5. What actional opportunities are available for the identified regional organization/institutions to strengthen and make governance more robust and effective? Researchers will justify with evidence what makes the recommendation actionable and explain how the recommendation connects to one or several gaps identified. Project Collaborators Governance for Survival Initiative (GSI). Past Project Examples After our pilot project cycle in 2023, 51 researchers completed 14 projects run by 12 project leads with 8 collaborating organisations or initiatives in 2024. In February 2025 we launched the Biosecurity Forecasting Group , which is now spinning out after the end of its 3-month trial version. See some examples of past project briefs below. For a longer list of our projects and outcomes, please see here . The Project Process Every project is different, and project leads are given flexibility to define scope. However all projects must be able to be completed remotely, and be able to be completed by at least 3 researchers spending no more than 5-10 hours per week in an approximately 2-3 month project period. Generally, a project can be divided into the following stages. 1. Project Ideation We get project ideas from internal research, calls for proposals, consulting with biosecurity experts, and based on what is valuable for the collaborating organisation. Once a project is confirmed, the project lead scopes out their project in detail with support from us, input from experts and the collaborating organisation (if applicable). A short project brief is then created to recruit researchers. 2. Project Recruitment Once applications open, researchers apply to the project(s) that they are interested in using the information from the project brief. The exact researcher application process is subject to change and may differ between projects. Our default process is a 2-3 week initial application period to submit the initial application form, which is then followed by a virtual on-demand interview. 3. Project Research The research scope and methods used will depend on the project. However, in all cases work to achieve the key deliverable is divided across the team, and we recommend that teams have regular (typically weekly) team meetings to maintain momentum and share progress. Examples of work may include doing literature reviews, conducting expert interviews, and making forecasts. 4. Project Completion There should be at least one main deliverable completed within the project period, even if the project continues after the end date or feeds into further work. In the 2023/2024 project cycles we suggested a midpoint presentation (internal), and a final presentation and final report as default deliverables. Other examples of deliverables may include policy briefs, technical requirement summaries, economic models, and scoping reviews. Aims & Number of Projects We aim to have an impact through our projects in two main ways: through direct project impact and by increasing biosecurity capacity through identifying and training promising people. We expect that most direct project impact is likely to come from providing support and structure for project leads to (i) do impactful work with the help of researchers or (ii) trialing project ideas which they may later spin out, as well as by (iii) increasing the capacity of other organisations, which allows them to do additional valuable work sooner. We therefore look for projects to fit into at least one of these categories. In 2024, our projects were run in ‘project cycles’, each with 7 projects running at the same time, with the scale allowing 51 researchers and 9 project leads outside of the founding team to complete projects. In 2025, we strategically shifted to running a smaller number of projects including individual projects. This allows us to prioritise projects and talent development that we expect to have the highest future impact given current capacity, while still significantly expanding biosecurity project opportunities compared to alternatives. Project Research Every project is different, and exactly how a project progresses is ultimately down to the project lead. However, there are some commonalities across all our projects. Week 1 In the first week, your project lead will usually hold an online meeting for the project onboarding. In this meeting you will receive more details on the project; final deliverables, and the structure of future meetings. The first week will also typically be dedicated to narrowing down the project scope; dividing research between project leads, and getting to know your fellow researchers. Weeks 2 - Penultimate Week The following weeks will typically involve independent research; regular meetings with the rest of the team, receiving feedback on your work so far, and contributing towards the final deliverable. We provide guidance and best practice to all project teams. However, this is the part of the project that varies the most: it is ultimately up to project leads what your day-to-day will look like. Final Week In the final week, you will typically finalise project deliverables, receive feedback, and your project lead will usually hold a final meeting to wrap-up the project. Project Completion Projects all result in different deliverables. However, an example of what the deliverables for a project might look like: Midpoint Presentation : a presentation of all the research work so far, largely used to provide accountability, course-correct, and support researchers. It is typically just internal. Final Presentation : a presentation summarising the research completed. Can be public or strictly internal. Final Report : a report that summarises the research completed in more detail. This is not always a report however, and can be a presentation, blog post, article, or even publication. These deliverables are usually shared with the collaborating organisation, and may be shared publicly. Why take part? OBG projects are very varied, and we think many types of people could benefit from participation in an OBG project. Students looking to explore biosecurity for the first time; recent graduates looking to upskill in biosecurity; experienced medical professionals looking to transition to biosecurity, and even more senior researchers looking to engage in an interesting, exploratory, project may all find participating in an OBG project worthwhile. Short research projects can be a good way to test your fit; explore a topic you've never considered before; skill up in a specific area; learn more about an interesting topic, or gain research experience. In every project cycle, we aim for projects that serve a range of experience levels, career stages, and interests. Ultimately, provided you are willing and able to spend a few hours a week on your OBG project, an OBG project can be a flexible option for almost anyone. Projects Oxford Biosecurity Group (OBG) runs part-time remote research projects in biosecurity and the AI-biology intersection, to tackle issues and foster talent by enabling them to gain experience, skills and connections. We are currently doing a general call for project lead interest to join our talent database, which we will launch in December 2025. This form will be next reviewed in December 2025, and then subsequently at ~3 month intervals (dates to be announced at a later time). Apply here by 9th December 2025 to be included in this review. Click below to see examples of some of the projects we’ve run in the past. We plan to next launch researcher applications in September 2025. Please sign up to our mailing list to be notified when applications open. See Our Projects Key Info Current Cycle Dates There is currently no project cycle taking place. Next Cycle Dates We do not currently have the dates of our next cycle confirmed. Stay tuned or join our mailing list for the announcement! Cycle Duration Project cycles are typically 8-12 weeks long. Requirements We cater to a range of backgrounds and experience levels. See more information about our requirements here .

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